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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
ERIC JARVIS WARREN, 
Defendant/Respondent 
Case No. 20020002-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
THE ISSUE ON CERTIORARI IS NOT WHETHER A WEAPONS 
FRISK IS AUTOMATICALLY JUSTIFIED PURSUANT TO A 
TRAFFIC STOP, BUT WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT ALL 
TRAFFIC STOPS ARE INHERENTLY DANGEROUS 
Defendant repeatedly asserts that "it would be patently unreasonable to adopt a 
rule that all traffic stops are inherently dangerous and therefore a frisk is always justified 
in those situations" See Resp. Br. at 7,14-15,18 (emphasis added). The State does not 
ask for such a rule, nor is that the issue before the Court. The issue framed in the State's 
Petition for Certiorari was as follows: 
In determining whether the officer who stopped defendant's car for minor 
traffic violations had reasonable suspicion to frisk defendant, did the court 
of appeals properly ignore this Court's recognition that traffic stops are 
inherently dangerous? 
Cert. Pet. at 1. 
The State has not and does not now argue that a weapons frisk is automatically 
justified by virtue of the dangers inherent in all traffic stops, but rather that reviewing 
courts cannot dismiss this critical and relevant factor in reviewing the totality of the 
circumstances confronting an officer conducting a traffic stop. As set out in the Brief of 
Petitioner, pp. 8-13, the court of appeals' refusal to consider the circumstances 
surrounding the instant traffic stop in their totality, including the inherent dangerousness 
of traffic stops was the basis for the court's erroneous determination that the instant frisk 
was unjustified. See Pet Br. at 7-14. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,122 
S.Ct. 744, 750 (2002) (reaffirming that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) "precludes" a 
"divide-and-conquer analysis1' in evaluating reasonable suspicion). 
DEFENDANT'S OBSERVATION THAT ANY GIVEN TRAFFIC 
STOP MAY AS LIKELY INVOLVE A NON-VIOLENT AS A 
VIOLENT OFFENDER IS IRRELEVANT 
Defendant urges this Court to affirm because he believes the court of appeals 
"properly noted that 'lesser traffic offenses' are not suggestive of weapons/" Resp. Br. at 
11,21 (quoting State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, f 16 n.4, 37 P.3d 270). As set out in 
the State's Brief of Petitioner, pp. 7-8, defendant's—and the court of appeals' view—is at 
odds with this Court's recognition that "concerns relating to officer safety" during traffic 
stops are "inherent." State v. James, 2000 UT 80, f 10 n.3, 13 P.3d 576 (citing Knowles v. 
Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117-118 (1998) and Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-110 
(1977)). See also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (recognizing "that the 
possibility of a violent encounter stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist 
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stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime 
might be uncovered during the stop"). Indeed, as this Court recognized, "the safety 
concerns guiding the Supreme Court's decision in Mimms do not depend on any 
particular showing that an officer was at heightened risk due to the unique circumstances 
of a given automobile stop[.]" James, 2000 UT 80, f 10 n.3. See also Knowles, 525 U.S. 
at 117 (recognizing that the concern for officer safety does not abate "in the case of a 
routine traffic stop"). Defendant's suggestion that any given traffic stop may as likely 
involve a non-violent as a violent offender is thus irrelevant. Resp. Br. at 11. 
Moreover, contrary to defendant's further suggestion, the traffic stops in Mimms, 
Wilson and James are not meaningfully distinguished on the ground that they involved 
lesser intrusions than a protective frisk, i.e., ordering and assisting drivers and passengers 
from stopped vehicles. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 107; Wilson, 519 U.S. at 411; James, 
2001 UT 364, ffl 3,11. Resp. Br. at 16-18. This distinction may have significance if the 
State was equating the danger inherent in traffic stops with automatic justification to frisk, 
but it is of no consequence in the absence of such an argument. Rather, the real 
importance of Mimms, Wilson, and James is that they recognize the inherent danger in 
traffic stops regardless of whether the traffic stop involves a minor or a major violation. 
James, 2000 UT 80, J 10 n.3. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 107 (Mimms was stopped for "an 
expired license plate"); Wilson, 519 U.S. at 410 (Wilson was stopped for traveling 64 
m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone and "no regular license tag"); James, 2000 UT 80, j^ 11 (James 
was detained for reckless driving). Defendant essentially acknowledges as much. Resp. 
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Br. at 19. ("At most, [Mimms, Wilson and James] set forth the proposition that safety 
concerns inhere in traffic stops, and for that reason the limited intrusions discussed in 
those cases are appropriate."). The problem here is that the court of appeals refiised to 
recognize that the potential for danger inheres in the fact of the traffic stop itself, 
regardless of the egregiousness of the specific violation. See Warren, 2001 UT 346, ff 
15-16 n.4. See Pet Br. at 11. 
The Tenth Circuit recently emphasized the morbid reality confronting police 
conducting a routine traffic stop: 
The terrifying truth is that officers face a very real risk of being assaulted 
with a dangerous weapon each time they stop a vehicle. The officer 
typically has to leave his vehicle, thereby exposing himself to potential 
assault by a motorist. The officer approaches the vehicle not knowing who 
the motorist is or what the motorists's intentions might be. It is precisely 
during such an exposed stop that the courts have been willing to give the 
officers 'wide latitude/ to discern the threat the motorist may pose to 
officer safety. 
An officer in today's reality has an objective, reasonable basis to fear for his 
or her life every time a motorist is stopped. Every traffic stop, after all, is a 
confrontation. The motorist must suspend his plans and anticipates 
receiving a fine and perhaps even a jail term. That expectation becomes 
even more real when the motorist or a passenger knows there are 
outstanding warrants or current criminal activity that may be discovered 
during the course of the stop. Resort to a loaded weapon is an increasingly 
plausible option for many such motorists to escape those consequences, and 
the officer, when stopping a car on a routine traffic stop never knows in 
advance which motorists have that option by virtue of possession of a 
loaded weapon in the car. 
United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215,1223 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 
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Here, in addition to the inherent danger in the fact of the traffic stop itself, Officer 
Swensen observed conduct immediately prior to the traffic violations which in his 
experience reasonably suggested defendant was involved in a drug or prostitution offense 
with another individual. Following the traffic stop, defendant lied about the invalidity of 
his license (R84). Given these circumstances and the other objective factors emphasized 
by the trial court including, at that unusually early hour—the isolated downtown location, 
the fact that Officer Swensen was alone, and that he needed to impound defendant's 
Cadillac, attempting to perform a protective frisk before proceeding with the impound 
was eminently reasonable (id.). See Pet. Br. at 10-11. 
In sum, the State is not asking that the well-established rule mat police may order 
drivers and passengers from their vehicles be extended to encompass an automatic 
protective frisk. Rather, the State is asking this Court to instruct lower courts that the 
danger inherent in all traffic stops must be considered as part of the totality of the 
circumstances test in any evaluation of the reasonableness of an officer's decision to frisk 
incident to a traffic stop. 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT AN 
OFFICER SUBJECTIVELY FEAR A SUSPECT BEFORE A 
PROTECTIVE FRISK IS JUSTIFIED 
Defendant also asserts that the court of appeals decision should be affirmed on 
certiorari "because Officer Swensen himself testified that he did not think that [defendant] 
was armed and dangerous and that he only frisks as a matter of routine." Resp. Br. at 10. 
Defendant claims that "if Officer Swensen himself did not believe that [defendant] was 
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armed and dangerous, then the reasonable particularized suspicion requirement which lies 
at the heart of Terry and the Fourth Amendment is not present." Resp. Br. at 10. Contrary 
to defendant's suggestion, neither Terry nor the Fourth Amendment require that police 
subjectively fear a suspect before a protective frisk is warranted. 
Rather, in assessing the reasonableness of a weapons frisk, "it is imperative that 
the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer 
at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief that the action taken was appropriate?" Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added). 
See also State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656,659 (Utah 1985) ("It is not essential that an officer 
actually have been in fear.")* Under this objective standard, "[t]he officer need not be 
absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent 
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others 
was in danger." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. "[D]ue weight must also be given[].. . to the 
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience." Id. See also Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. at 751 (2002) (recognizing that totality of 
circumstances review "allows officers to draw on their experience and specialized 
training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information 
available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person"') (quotation omitted). 
"That one officer is braver (or more foolhardy) than another, and therefore not 
subjectively concerned for his or safety, should not deprive that particular officer of a 
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right to protect his or her safety. Even the brave officer should be allowed to minimize 
the ever-present risk of being attacked or killed." Holt, 264 F.3d at 1225-1226. 
While Officer Swensen expressed no subjective fear of defendant, he did articulate 
an objective officer safety concern (see R129:9). As noted previously, the trial court also 
identified several objective factors justifying the frisk, including the unusually early hour, 
the downtown location (no residences or open business), defendant's and his companion's 
suspicious behavior prior to the stop (suggesting a possible drug or prostitution offense), 
the fact that Officer Swensen was alone, defendant's lie about the status of his license, 
and the need to impound defendant's vehicle (See R84). See Pet. Br. at 10-11. 
In evaluating the reasonableness of the frisk, the court of appeals' purported to 
recognize that "'[i]t is not essential that an officer actually have been in fear' to perform a 
Terry frisk." That recognition amounted to mere lip service when the court of appeals 
summarily concluded that "[t]he fact that Officer Swensen candidly admitted at the 
suppression hearing that he did not believe Warren was armed at the time he decided to 
frisk him clearly takes Officer Swensen's actions outside of Terry's limited justification 
for warrantless searches." Warren, 2001 UT App 346, t l 14,16. Essentially ignoring the 
trial court's findings, the court of appeals reversed on the ground that Officer Swensen's 
subjective impression was alone determinative. Id. Applying the court of appeals' 
reasoning, officers who have no subjective fear of a suspect, but who do have objective 
safety concerns will never be able to justify a protective frisk. Warren, 2001 UT App 
346,116. Such a result is contrary to Terry, and to James in particular (where the officer 
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similarly expressed no subjective safety concern), and thus presents no compelling 
ground for affirming the court of appeals' flawed analysis. Id. at f 10 n.3. 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals' conflicting and inadequate analysis should be reversed and 
remanded.1 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on 3£t>ctober2002. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
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'As set out in Pet. Br. at 14 n.3, remand is necessary because the court of appeals 
did not address the issue of whether the officer's brief questioning unduly prolonged the 
traffic stop prior to the frisk. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346,116 n.5. 
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